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Abstract—Steganography aims to conceal the very fact that the
communication takes place, by embedding a message into a digit
object such as image without introducing noticeable artifacts. A
number of steganographic systems have been developed in past
years, most of which, however, are confined to the laboratory
conditions where the real-world use of steganography are rarely
concerned. In this paper, we introduce an alternative perspective
to steganography. A graph-theoretic model to steganography on
social networks is presented to analyze real-world steganographic
scenarios. In the graph, steganographic participants are corre-
sponding to the vertices with meaningless unique identifiers. Each
edge allows the two vertices to communicate with each other by
any steganographic algorithm. Meanwhile, the edges are associ-
ated with weights to quantize the corresponding communication
risk (or say cost). The optimization task is to minimize the overall
risk, which is modeled as additive over the social network. We
analyze different scenarios on a social network, and provide
the suited solutions to the corresponding optimization tasks. We
prove that a multiplicative probabilistic graph is equivalent to an
additive weighted graph. From the viewpoint of an attacker, he
may hope to detect suspicious communication channels, the data
encoder(s) and the data decoder(s). We present limited detection
analysis to steganographic communication on a network.
Index Terms—Steganography, steganalysis, graph, social net-
works, social media, shortest path, spanning tree.
I. INTRODUCTION
Any communication system that aims to convey a message
to the intentional receiver while conceal the very fact that the
communication takes place can be classified as steganography
[1]. A most important yet still challenging requirement for a
secure steganographic system is that it should be impossible
for an eavesdropper to distinguish between ordinary objects
and objects that contain hidden information [2]. Basically,
both steganography and cryptography provide secret commu-
nication. Cryptography, however, often exposes clear marks on
the encrypted data for an eavesdropper to trace down, whereas
steganography even conceals the presence of communication.
Steganography works by hiding a message within a digital
object [3]. The resulting stego object containing the hidden
information has no noticeable perceptual difference to the
original host. It will be sent to the receiver via some insecure
public channel such as the Internet. The goal of the decoder is
to reconstruct the hidden information for subsequent purpose.
Therefore, a secure steganographic system always requires us
to develop such embedding and extraction algorithms that the
stego object should not cause any suspicion [2] and the hidden
information can be reliably recovered at the decoder side.
A number of advanced steganographic systems such as [4]–
[8] have been developed to achieve the secret communication.
The existing works have moved the underlying research of
steganography ahead. However, with the rapidly development
of information technologies, especially for social medias such
as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram etc., there still has a long
way to large-scale practice for steganography. A reasonable
explanation for why steganography has not become common
use like cryptography in social network services may be the
lack of an adequate and real-world benchmark, which leads us
to often perform the steganographic experiments on synthetic
data through a local (or offline) manner. It would be quite
desirable to study the social behaviors, protocols and any
other possible scenarios of steganography. In this sense, we
may not care about the details of the used steganographic
algorithms, but rather quantize the concerned characteristics of
steganography as analyzable scalars for possible optimization,
which may provide us the access to move steganography from
laboratory into real-world.
Wikipedia1 defines the social network as a social structure
consisting of a set of social actors such as individuals and
organizations, sets of dyadic ties, and social interactions be-
tween actors. The social network perspective provides lots of
methods for analyzing the structure of entire social entities
and theories explaining the patterns observed in these struc-
tures. The study of structures uses social network analysis,
especially graph theory, to identify local or global patterns,
locate influential entities, examine network dynamics, and
address many optimization tasks. Steganography is essentially
a communication task. It is straightforward to model stegano-
graphic activities on a social network. In the network, the
vertices correspond to the people such as the data encoders and
decoders or other social entities such as information routing
devices. The edges represent the social links [9] between them,
which allow the vertices to communicate with each other by
any steganographic means.
We present a simple graph-theoretic model to steganography
on social networks in this paper. We will not pay attention
to the design of a steganographic scheme that relies on some
1Online available: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social network
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specified cover, but rather model it as a general communication
flow on a network. The goal is to reliably convey messages
from the encoders to the decoders with the lowest communi-
cation risk (or say cost) via the edges corresponding to the
insecure channels. The edges are associated with weights that
reflect the corresponding communication risks. A successful
steganographic communication between any two vertices will
correspond to a network path with a low risk. We model
the overall risk as additive over the social network, which
enables us to analyze different steganography-based commu-
nication scenarios and deal with different optimization tasks.
From the viewpoint of an attacker, he may detect suspicious
communication channels and even the data encoder(s) and the
data decoder(s). We therefore further analyze the detection for
steganographic network.
The rest of this paper are organized as follows. We formulate
our problem in Section II. In Section III, We analyze different
steganographic communication scenarios on social networks
and provide reliable solutions. A probabilistic perspective has
also been investigated. In Section IV, we present approaches to
detecting steganographic communication. Finally, we conclude
this paper in Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A social network corresponds to a graph structure G(V,E),
where V = {v1, v2, ..., vn} denotes the set of vertices and
E = {e1, e2, ..., em} represents the set of edges. Here,
every edge ek ∈ E corresponds to a vertex-pair, namely
ek = (vi, vj) for some 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n. An undirected graph is
a graph in which edges have no orientation. This indicates that,
(vi, vj) is equivalent to (vj , vi). In this paper, we are to study
undirected graph. A path (if any) between two vertices vi and
vj is corresponding to such a vertex sequence (vq1 , vq2 , ..., vqt)
that vq1 = vi, vqt = vj and (vqk−1 , vqk) ∈ E for all 2 ≤ k ≤ t.
We model steganography on a social network G(V,E). The
vertices correspond to steganographic participants such as the
data encoders, decoders, even the potential attackers, and other
social entities such as servers, information routing devices. The
edges show the steganographic communication links between
vertices. It allows a message to be conveyed along the edges.
Each ei ∈ E (1 ≤ i ≤ m) is associated with a weight wi > 0
to reveal the steganographic communication risk, which may
involve the possibility of being attacked, the cost of bandwidth
resource and other possible expenses. A path (if any) between
vi and vj (1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n) implies that, vi can share a
message with vj along the path with the risk that depends on
the assigned weights of the edges belonging to the path.
Mathematically, we use S = {s1, s2, ..., sn1} ⊂ V and
T = {t1, t2, ..., tn2} ⊂ V to denote the encoder set and
decoder set. For each si ∈ S, we define its individual
decoder set as Ti ⊂ T , meaning that, si hopes to send a
message to each of Ti. Here, ∪n1i=1Ti = T . Let P (vi, vj)
be a set including all paths between vi and vj . Each path
in P (vi, vj) is corresponding to a subset of E. Let P (vi, vj)
= {L1(vi, vj), L2(vi, vj), ..., L|P (vi,vj)|(vi, vj)}. Here, | ∗ |
means the size of a set. For compactness, we will sometimes
consider Lk(vi, vj) ∈ P (vi, vj) as a set including all involved
edges, i.e., Lk(vi, vj) ⊂ E.
We assume that G(V,E) is connected, namely, there always
exists at least one path between any two vertices. Otherwise,
we should separately analyze all connected subgraphs since
two vertices belonging to two different connected components
will be never able to send messages to each other. The
optimization task is to find such a subset of E that it enables all
si ∈ S to send a message to all decoders in Ti, and the overall
risk can be minimized. Let R(S, T,Eusable) denote the overall
risk, where Eusable ⊂ E is the used set for steganographic
communication, the optimization problem is then formulated
as:
Eopt(S, T ) = arg min
Eusable⊂E
R(S, T,Eusable). (1)
III. MODELS AND SOLUTIONS
A path (if any) between two vertices vi and vj corresponds
to a candidate communication chain over the network. A path
with the minimum communication risk will be the preferred
choice for the two vertices. We define the communication risk
over a path as additive, meaning that, for arbitrary Lk(vi, vj) ∈
P (vi, vj), 1 ≤ k ≤ |P (vi, vj)|, the communication risk is:
R({vi}, {vj}, Lk(vi, vj)) =
∑
ei∈Lk(vi,vj)
wi. (2)
The assigned weight wi for ei ∈ E reflects the possibility of
being attacked, bandwidth cost and other quantifiable/abstract
characteristics. A larger weight indicates that, the correspond-
ing channel is less secure. The above additive assumption is
reasonable since a minimized sum is intuitively corresponding
to a lowest communication cost, even though the ground
truth may be not exactly additive. In addition, the additive
assumption could make the optimization target more clear and
amenable to mathematical analysis or empirical study.
A. Peer-to-Peer Steganographic Communication
The simplest model is the peer-to-peer (P2P) steganographic
communication problem, where S = {s1} and T = T1 = {t1}.
In case that wi = wj for all 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ m, we have:
Eopt(S, T ) = arg min
Lk(s1,t1)∈P (s1,t1)
R({s1}, {t1}, Lk(s1, t1))
= arg min
Lk(s1,t1)∈P (s1,t1)
∑
ei∈Lk(s1,t1)
wi
= arg min
Lk(s1,t1)∈P (s1,t1)
|Lk(s1, t1)|,
(3)
which requires us to find a path with the least number of edges.
It is straightforward to use the basic graph-traversal technique
called breadth-first search (BFS) [10] to quickly identify the
optimal path with a computational complexity of O(|V |+|E|).
BFS can be used for the design of steganography [11], [12].
In case that there exists some wi 6= wj , it requires us to
find the shortest path from s1 to t1. This can be addressed
by Dijkstra’s algorithm [10], which can be implemented with
a computational complexity of O(|E|+ |V |log2|V |) by using
a priority queue data structure. It is noted that, the weights
should be all non-negative here. Actually, one can also use
other shortest path algorithms such as Floyd-Warshall algo-
rithm [10], which allows the weights to be negative.
There may exist multiple paths with the minimum commu-
nication risk. In this case, it would be desirable to accept such
a path that the number of vertices is minimum, which can be
addressed by using a dynamic programming technique after
calling the Dijkstra’s algorithm. Let f(vi, vj) be the number
of vertices in such an optimal path (between vi and vj) that
it has the least number of vertices. Accordingly,
f(vi, vj) = min {f(vi, vk) + f(vk, vj)− 1 | vk ∈ V }. (4)
Therefore, for the P2P steganographic communication net-
work, we can determine the optimal communication chain out
with a low computational complexity. Notice that, if there has
no path between vi and vj , no communication will be available
between them. In steganography, though there has no explicit
function between distortion and security, a lower embedding
distortion often corresponds to a higher security level. If the
distortion can be well modeled on a graph, we may use shortest
path algorithms to achieve optimal or near-optimal embedding
strategy such as Syndrome-Trellis Codes [13].
B. Multi-Point Steganographic Communication
It is more common that |S| > 1 and |T | > 1 in practice.
Suppose that S = {s1} and T = T1 = {t1, t2, ..., tg}, an
intuitive idea of finding the feasible communication strategy
is to determine all shortest paths between s1 and each one of
{t1, t2, ..., tg}. Let Eopt(s1, ti) represent an optimal communi-
cation path between s1 and ti. If Eopt(s1, ti)∩Eopt(s1, tj) = ∅
for all i 6= j, one may use ∪gi=1Eopt(s1, ti) as the final strategy.
It may be not optimal from risk optimization view since there
may exist path redundancy. E.g., in Fig. 1 (a), S = {v1},
T = {v5, v6}, Eopt(v1, v5) = {(v1, v3), (v3, v4), (v4, v5)} and
Eopt(v1, v6) = {(v1, v2), (v2, v4), (v4, v6)}. If the encoder v1
uses Eopt(v1, v5)∪Eopt(v1, v6) as the communication strategy,
when he wishes to share the same message to both v5 and v6,
he needs to send the message two times: one is conveyed by
v1 → v3 → v4 → v5 and the other is v1 → v2 → v4 → v6.
It is straightforward to prove that w1 +w2 = w5 +w6, mean-
ing that, {(v1, v3), (v3, v4), (v4, v6)} and {(v1, v2), (v2, v4),
(v4, v5)} are also the optimal paths for v6 and v5, respectively.
It implies that, v1 can send the message only once along
v1 → v2 → v4 and v4 can distribute it to v5 and v6 (though
v4 cannot retrieve the embedded message). It is seen that, the
overall risk is intuitively reduced as shown in Fig. 1 (b).
In case that Eopt(s1, ti) ∩ Eopt(s1, tj) 6= ∅ for some i 6=
j, ∪gi=1Eopt(s1, ti) is also not optimal for the final strategy.
That is, the edge(s) belonging to (at least) two paths will be
used for transmission multiple times. It is reasonable since an
encoder may send different messages along different paths,
which may require the encoder to use the same edge multiple
times. From the risk optimization view, the weights assigned to
the edges are actually fusion results. It implies that, the impact
of the used times of any edge has been (roughly) quantized
by its weight. Thus, we may not care about the used times of
Fig. 1. An example of multi-point steganographic communication.
edges directly. Accordingly, with the aforementioned additive
assumption over a single path, the overall risk for multi-point
communication is defined as:
Eopt(S, T ) = arg min
Eusable⊂E
R(S, T,Eusable)
= arg min
Eusable⊂E
∑
ei∈Eusable
wi.
(5)
Let Ui = {si} ∪ Ti for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n1. We assume that,
for all possible Ui, there should always exist such j 6= i
that Ui ∩ Uj 6= ∅. The reason is that, for some Ui, if for
all j 6= i, we have Ui ∩ Uj = ∅. Then, we can split (S, T )
into two multi-point steganographic communication subtasks,
i.e., (S − {si}, T − Ti) and ({si}, Ti). Therefore, it can
be inferred that, under the above assumption, U1, U2, ..., Un1
can be merged into multiple disjoint vertex sets, denoted by
U
(1)
1 , U
(1)
2 , ..., U
(1)
n
(1)
1
where n(1)1 < n1. By recursively applying
the above assumption2 to U (1)1 , U
(1)
2 , ..., U
(1)
n
(1)
1
until there has
only one set, we then write:
Lemma III.1. Eopt(S, T ) will form a tree structure.
Proof. It is straightforward to prove that the resulting subgraph
due to Eopt(S, T ) is connected. We have to prove that, there
has no circle in the subgraph. Suppose that, there has a circle in
the subgraph. One can always remove the edge with the largest
weight from the circle such that the new subgraph will be still
connected and the overall risk will not be worse. Therefore,
Eopt(S, T ) forms a tree structure 3.
We begin with a simplified problem, where V = S∪T . The
optimal solution is equivalent to finding minimum spanning
tree (MST), which can be solved by Kruskal’s algorithm
or Prim’s algorithm [10]. It is mentioned that, the greedy
strategy for computing MST has been exploited in the design
of steganography such as optimal parity assignment [14].
Actually, the original problem to be optimized is essentially
corresponding to such a graph problem: given an undirected
graph G(V,E) without negative edge-weights and a subset
2One can also assume that for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n1, there should always exist
such j < i that Ui ∩ Uj 6= ∅. Both ensure that, we do not need to split
(S, T ) into multiple subtasks.
3Note that, when the proposed assumption is not required, Eopt(S, T ) will
form a forest structure. A tree is a special case of a forest. Unless mentioned,
in default, we think the proposed assumption holds.
of vertices S ∪ T called terminals, the goal is to find such a
tree of minimum weight-sum that it contains all the terminals
(but may include additional vertices). This problem is typically
called as Steiner Tree Problem (STP), which is NP-hard [15].
The STP is seen as a generalization of two other combinatorial
optimization problems mentioned above, i.e., the shortest path
problem and the MST problem. If the STP deals with only two
terminals, it reduces to finding a shortest path. If all vertices
are terminals, it is equivalent to the MST problem. Therefore,
one may employ the existing approximation algorithms [15]–
[17] designed for the STP to find the suitable strategy for
multi-point steganographic communication.
C. Probabilistic Graph Perspective
We have used a weight to expose the communication risk of
a channel. It enables us to deal with different steganographic
scenarios by using the shortest path algorithm, MST algorithm,
or approximation algorithms designed for the STP. Consid-
ering real-world applications, it would be more intuitive to
use statistical information to characterize the reliability of a
channel. The reason is, in practice, the raw data we may obtain
is more like a series of successful or failure records, which may
not only rely on some specified steganographic algorithm.
By analyzing statistical characteristics of a series of records,
one may roughly estimate the prior probability for the commu-
nication optimization. There are at least two advantages. First,
prior probability does not only rely on some specified stegano-
graphic algorithm. Second, probabilistic analysis will be more
robust. Suppose that, the steganographic social network are
modified with probabilistic edges, meaning that, the edges are
associated with a probability, rather than a weight, denoting
the successful probability of steganographic communication,
which is derived from the real-world records (even though we
have no real data at the moment). Accordingly, the reliability
of a path Lk(vi, vj) ∈ P (vi, vj) between vi and vj can be
assumed as the product of probability values along the path:
J({vi}, {vj}, Lk(vi, vj)) =
∏
ei∈Lk(vi,vj)
pi, (6)
where pi denotes the assigned probability of ei. The mul-
tiplicative assumption is reasonable in practice since two
edges corresponding to two different channels could be ap-
proximately independent. Similarly, for G(V,E), we further
specify:
Eopt(S, T ) = arg max
Eusable⊂E
J(S, T,Eusable)
= arg max
Eusable⊂E
∏
ei∈Eusable
pi,
(7)
which requires us to find a set of edges such that the overall
reliability (multiplicative) is maximum. We will prove that:
Lemma III.2. Eopt(S, T ) will also form a tree structure, and
the solution is equivalent to solving STP on a weighted graph.
Proof. We write:
Eopt(S, T ) = arg max
Eusable⊂E
∏
ei∈Eusable
pi
= arg min
Eusable⊂E
− log2
∏
ei∈Eusable
pi
= arg min
Eusable⊂E
∑
ei∈Eusable
log2
1
pi
.
(8)
By assigning wi = log2
1
pi
, we can translate the probabilistic
graph into a weighted graph so that our optimization task is
exactly equivalent to solving STP in the weighted graph 4.
A multiplicative probabilistic graph is therefore correspond-
ing to an additive weighted graph. The optimization solutions
are similar to each other.
IV. DETECTION ANALYSIS
An attacker may serve as a network manager (or monitor),
who has the surveillance right. He hopes to detect whether the
steganographic communication exist or not over the network.
A straightforward idea is to use the existing advanced steganal-
ysis algorithms [18]–[22], which mainly rely on sophisticated
manual feature design, conventional classifiers and deep neural
networks. Accordingly, the detection is equivalent to designing
reliable steganalysis systems. In other words, to resist against
conventional steganalysis algorithms over a social network, we
should use statistical undetectable steganographic systems or
other efficient strategies, e.g., batch steganography [23], [24].
We will not study it in this paper since there are a lot of related
works that have been reported.
From the viewpoint of social network, we here consider two
attacks, i.e, structural attack and statistical attack. The former
analyzes the structural characteristics of a graph without
considering external effects, which allows us to easily analyze
problems in an offline manner. The latter will take into account
the communication activities in the network. It would be more
useful than the structural analysis.
A. Structural Attack
Structural attack relies on the network structure. It is
probably not suitable for detecting the data encoder(s) and
decoder(s) “directly” sometimes, but to identify the channels
denoted by edges. We define δ(e) as the number of such
pair (vi, vj) that e ∈ E belongs to at least one shortest path
between vi and vj , i.e.,
δ(e) = |{(vi, vj)|1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, e ∈ Ps(vi, vj)}|, (9)
where Ps(vi, vj) is the set including all shortest paths between
vi and vj . We define the path-support rate (PSR) of e as:
r(e) =
δ(e)∑
e′∈E δ(e′)
. (10)
A higher PSR indicates that it is intuitively more likely to
be exploited for steganographic communication. For detection,
4Here, the aforementioned assumption for Lemma III.1 should hold. Oth-
erwise, it would form a forest, which is not corresponding to the STP.
more attention should be paid to edges with a high PSR. We
conduct experiments with virtual data to qualitatively describe
the detection performance. Suppose that, an attacker selects a
subset of E, denoted by Eattack, according to PSR. Each edge
in Eattack corresponds to a communication channel. Traditional
steganalysis algorithms will be applied to the detection of these
channels. We define the edge-selection rate (ESR) as the size-
ratio between Eattack and E, i.e., |Eattack|/|E|. To determine
Eattack, the PSR values for all edges are sorted in an increasing
order, and the top-|Eattack| edges constitute Eattack. We simulate
P2P steganographic communication on a network by randomly
choosing two different vertices and determining a shortest path
between them (by BFS). In a path, if there is at least one edge
belonging to Eattack, we say the communication path will be at
the risk of being detected by such as steganalysis algorithms.
For a random network, we randomly generate a number of
vertex-pairs and compute their shortest paths. We define the
path-hit rate (PHR) as the ratio between the number of such
shortest paths that they are at risk of being detected and the
number of tested vertex-pairs. We use PHR as the detection
metric. Fig. 2 shows the results for different random networks.
Due to the lack of real data, we cannot guarantee that Fig. 2
characterizes the real-world scenarios accurately. However, we
can still draw the potential rule of random data, which may
be helpful for future study. That is, for a fixed number of
vertices, a larger number of edges results in a worse detection
performance. When the number of edges approaches to the
upper-bound, the detection curve will be rather close to y = x,
which means random guessing. It is seen that, with low ESR
values (which may be often used in applications), the detection
performance is satisfied (acceptable) to the steganographer(s).
However, we admit that it may be not significant since the real
steganographic network may not follow random structure.
The structural attack is largely affected and reflected by the
topological structure of the network, which involves degrees,
connectedness, path planning and relationship of vertices. Any
efficient algorithms focusing on identifying critical or unusual
edges and vertices are likely suited to steganographic network.
B. Statistical Attack
The structural attack may result in a high missing detection
rate since it does not take into account the real data. For data-
driven statistical attack, it allows an attacker to mine unusual
information from real records, which is more robust. We here
present limited discussion for the statistical attack.
1) Data-driven Structural Analysis: This is similar to the
above structural attack. A straightforward idea is to construct
a subnetwork according to the real-data flow. Then, structural
analysis may be used to identify the data encoder(s) and data
decoder(s). Notice that, the subnetwork may contain multiple
connected components. Comparing with the above structural
attack, data-driven structural analysis takes into account the
real communication activities and features. It can reduce the
impact of vertices that never communicate with others.
2) Data-driven Statistical Analysis: The explicit statistical
characteristics (or distribution) of steganographic communica-
tion is unknown to us. We expect to exploit the communication
activities to identify the anomalies. We divide the data-driven
statistical analysis into three categories roughly, i.e., behavior
analysis, content analysis, unsupervised learning analysis.
Content-based detection requires us to construct the differ-
entiable statistical information from any form of the concerned
objects, for which it is common to use efficient classifiers such
as neural networks and SVM or other boosting strategies, e.g.,
ensemble, to distinguish “normal” and “abnormal” from the
extracted feature vectors or feature maps. The traditional ste-
ganalysis algorithms can be therefore easily classified as a core
approach to content analysis. Unlike traditional steganalysis
methods, general content analysis on a network may involve
a set of vertices or edges.
The behavior analysis is not intuitive in the steganographic
network. A common framework in steganography is to embed
secret data into a specified cover. The stego object is then sent
to a receiver, for whom the embedded data can be retrieved.
We call it as cover-based steganography. Due to the widely use
of social medias, one may also apply behavior steganography
[25] (a kind of coverless steganography) for communication. It
is necessary to identify those suspicious vertices from unusual
behavior observations. The social behavior can be quantized as
analyzable parameters associated to network vertices or edges.
Also, they may be used to construct a new behavior network
for analysis. Feature design would be critical for both cases.
The content analysis and the behavior analysis often require
supervised learning. On the one hand, it is not easy to obtain
the real sample labels. On the other hand, the time-varying
network may lead to a low detection accuracy. Though the
raw structural analysis corresponds to unsupervised learning,
it focuses on the topological characteristics of the network
and is independent of real data. There are at least two types
for unsupervised learning analysis, i.e., clustering-based and
model-based. According to the extracted features from the raw
data, clustering-based methods treat the classification task as
the clustering problem in data mining. While, the model-based
methods may assume that ordinary activities meet some rules
and any abnormal behavior will break them down.
The existing anomaly detection approaches and perspectives
for social networks probably also work for a steganographic
network though they were designed to other social scenarios
originally. However, more attention should be paid to the
characteristics of the steganographic behavior itself.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
A preferred starting point of scientific research is to make a
model for the problem [24]. In this paper, we model steganog-
raphy based communication on a network. The optimization
problem is to minimize the overall secret communication
risk, which is considered as additive over the network. We
have analyzed different scenarios, and provided the optimized
solutions. With real-world data, one may estimate the prior
information for an insecure channel, which reveals the reli-
ability of channels. By translating the probabilistic network
into a weighted network, one could find the optimal (P2P) or
Fig. 2. The detection performance with structural analysis for P2P stegano-
graphic communication on randomly generated networks.
near-optimal (multi-point) communication strategy. We also
present some discussion from detection view. The future
considerations and works include:
• A single weight or probability would make the problem
amenable to mathematical analysis. It may not character-
ize the steganographic channel very well. Feature vectors
may be more desirable.
• A basic theoretical model could be more robust and less
ambiguous. However, the real-world is more messy and
complex. It would be important to take into account the
attackers and other constraints in the social network.
• A challenging problem is to build an adequate and real-
world benchmark for experiments. A compromised way
focusing on synthetic data may be a good choice.
• Moving steganography from laboratory into real-world is
a system engineering. Not only the underlying technolo-
gies should be analyzed, but also such as social behaviors
should be studied, which may require knowledge about
management, psychology, network analysis etc.
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